A note on commitment when there are errors in communication by Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen
A note on commitment when there are errors in
communication 
Anders Poulsen Odile Poulsen
School of Economics, University of East Anglia School of Economics, University of East Anglia
Abstract
In this note we analyze the viability of a commitment strategy when there are errors in
communication. We consider an entry deterrence game where with a certain probability the
Incumbent's decision is either perfectly observed by the Potential Intruder or, with
complementary probability, nothing is observed. We find that in equilibrium the Incumbent
benefits as much from a decision to accommodate entry as a commitment to fight entry being
observed with sufficiently high probability by the potential intruder. Indeed, there is an
equilibrium where the Incumbent commits to fight entry with probability one even when this
action is observed with zero probability.
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